Abstract. Pairing-based cryptosystems rely on bilinear non-degenerate maps called pairings, such as the Tate and Weil pairings defined over certain elliptic curve groups. In this paper we show how to compress pairing values, how to couple this technique with that of point compression, and how to benefit from the compressed representation to speed up exponentiations involving pairing values, as required in many pairing based protocols.
Introduction
With the discovery of a viable identity-based encryption scheme based on the Weil pairing [4] , pairing-based cryptography has become of great interest to cryptographers. Since then, pairing-based protocols -many with novel properties -have been proposed for key exchange [25] , digital signature [5] , encryption [4] , and signcryption [23] . Although the Weil pairing was initially proposed as a suitable construct for the realisation of such protocols, it is now accepted that the Tate pairing is preferable for its greater efficiency. Supersingular elliptic curves were originally proposed as a suitable setting for pairing-based schemes; recent work has shown that certain ordinary curves are equally suitable, and offer greater flexibility in the choice of security parameters [3, 21] . Fast computer algorithms for the computation of the Tate pairing on both supersingular and ordinary curves have been suggested in [1, 3, 9] .
The Tate pairing calculation involves an application of Miller's algorithm [19] coupled to a final exponentiation to get a unique value. A typical protocol step requires the calculation of a pairing value followed by a further exponentiation of the result.
In this paper we explore the concept of compressed pairings, their efficient computation, and the subsequent processing (typically exponentiation) of pairing values. Our main contribution is to show that one can effectively reduce the bandwidth occupied by pairing values without impairing security nor processing time; in some cases, one even obtains a 30%-40% speed enhancement. As a byproduct, our work gives further motivation for the approach Galbraith et al. [10] , who propose taking the trace of the pairing value to avoid loss of security.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic mathematical concepts. Section 3 discusses laddering exponentiation of pairing values, and introduces a laddering variant of the BKLS [1] algorithm to compute pairings. Section 4 describes how to compress pairing values to half length, and establishes a connection with the techniques of point compression and point reduction. Section 5 defines a ternary exponentiation ladder for finite fields in characteristic 3. Section 6 describes how to compress pairing values to one third of their length, presents a more efficient and slightly simpler version of the Duursma-Lee algorithm [8] that enables pairing computation in compressed form, and discusses improved variants of point compression and point reduction in characteristic 3. We summarise our work in section 7.
Mathematical Preliminaries
The theory behind elliptic curve cryptography is well documented in standard texts. The reader is referred to [18] for more background.
Let p be a prime number, m a positive integer and Fp m the finite field with p m − 1 elements; p is said to be the characteristic of Fp, and m is its extension degree. Unless otherwise stated, we assume p = 2 throughout this paper.
Let q = p m . An elliptic curve E(F q ) is the set of solutions (x, y) over Fq to an equation of form E : y 2 + a 1 xy + a 3 y = x 3 + a 2 x 2 + a 4 x + a 6 , where a i ∈ Fq, together with an additional point at infinity, denoted O. The same equation defines curves over F q k for k > 0 (although note that the a i remain in Fq). The number of points of an elliptic curve E(F q k ), denoted #E(F q k ), is called the order of the curve over the field F q k .
An (additive) Abelian group structure is defined on E by the well known secant-and-tangent method [24] . Let n = #E(F q k ). The order of a point P ∈ E is the least nonzero integer r such that rP = O, where rP is the sum of r terms equal to P . The order of a point divides the curve order. For a given integer r, the set of all points P ∈ E such that rP = O is denoted E[r]. Commonly this set forms a single cyclic group. However, multiple subgroups of prime order r (where r 2 ∤ n) will exist with embedding degree k for some k > 0 if r | q k − 1 and r ∤ q s − 1 for any 0 < s < k. It is in fact not difficult to find suitable curves with this property for relatively small values of k as described in [2, 6, 7] . We are interested here in curves where k is even, as this case facilitates fast calculation of the Tate pairing [3] .
For our purposes, a divisor is a formal sum A = P a P (P ) of points on the curve E(F q k ). An Abelian group structure is defined on the set of divisors by the addition of corresponding coefficients in their formal sums; in particular, nA = P (n a P )(P ). The degree of a divisor A is the sum deg(A) = P a P .
Let f : E(F q k ) → F q k be a function on the curve and let deg(A) = 0. We define f (A) ≡ P f (P )
aP . The divisor of a function f is (f ) ≡ P ord P (f )(P ). A divisor A is called principal if A = (f ) for some function (f ). A divisor A is principal if and only if deg(A) = 0 and P a P P = O [18, theorem 2.25]. Two divisors A and B are equivalent, A ∼ B, if their difference A − B is a principal divisor. Let P ∈ E(F q )[r] where r is coprime to q, and let A P be a divisor equivalent to (P ) − (O); under these circumstances the divisor rA P is principal, and hence there is a function f P such that (f P ) = rA P = r(P ) − r(O). The (reduced) Tate pairing of order r is the map e r : E(
The Tate pairing is bilinear, and will be non-degenerate if Q is chosen from a coset containing a point of order r which is linearly independent from P . The computation of f P (D) is achieved by an application of Miller's algorithm [19] , whose output is only defined up to an r-th power in F * q k . The final exponentiation to the power of (q k − 1)/r is needed to produce a unique result, and it also makes it possible to compute f P (Q) rather than f P (D) [1] . Sometimes we will drop the r subscript of the Tate pairing, writing simply e(P, Q).
Lucas sequences
Lucas sequences provide a relatively cheap way of implementing Fq 2 exponentiation in a subgroup whose order divides q + 1. They have been extensively studied in the literature, and a fast "laddering" algorithm for their computation has been developed [14, 15, 28] , using ideas originally develop by Montgomery to speed up scalar multiplication on elliptic curves [22] . Lucas sequences have been suggested as a suitable vehicle for certain public-key schemes [26] . The laddering algorithm can in fact be used as an alternative to the standard square-and-multiply approach to exponentiation in any Abelian group, but it is particularly well-suited for Lucas sequences and certain parameterisations of elliptic curves [15] . The authors of [15] go on to emphasise that the laddering algorithm requires very little memory, facilitates parallel computing, and has a natural resistance to side-channel attacks when used in a cryptographic context.
The Lucas sequence consists of a pair of functions U k (P, Q) and V k (P, Q), evaluating as elements of Fq. Commonly Q = 1, in which case we write simply U k (P ) and V k (P ) or omit the arguments altogether. For this distinguished case the sequences are defined as
Only the V k sequence needs to be explicitly evaluated, as we also have the relationship
The fast laddering algorithm is described in Appendix A.
Exponentiating pairing values
We consider first the case of embedding degree k = 2 (although the following discussion also covers the case k = 2d with the substitution q → q d ). We represent an element of the field Fq 2 as x + iy, where x, y ∈ Fq, and i 2 = δ for some quadratic non-residue δ ∈ Fq. Assume in what follows that all arithmetic is in the field Fq.
The final exponentiation in this case consists of a raising to the power of (q − 1)(q + 1)/r. This can be considered in two parts -exponentiation to the power of q − 1 followed by exponentiation to the power of (q + 1)/r. Now if the output of Miller's algorithm is x + iy ∈ Fq 2 , then
which is obviously much quicker than the standard square-and-multiply algorithm. The element a + ib ≡ (x + iy) q−1 calculated in this fashion has the property:
where a 2 − δb 2 is called the norm of a+ ib; this property, easily verified by simple substitution, is maintained under any subsequent exponentiation. An element of this form in Fq 2 is called unitary [12] . Also observe that (a + ib) −1 = (a − ib) for a unitary element. In fact, any element of Fq 2 whose order divides q + 1 will have this property.
A unitary element can obviously be determined up to the sign of b from a alone, using equation 1. And this is our first observation -the output of the Tate algorithm contains some considerable redundancy. It could be represented by a single element of Fq and a single bit to represent the sign of b, rather than as a full element of Fq 2 .
One can efficiently raise a unitary element of Fq 2 to a power m by means of Lucas sequences. This is a consequence of the observation that
as one can verify by induction. As pointed out above, only V m (2a) needs to be explicitly calculated. If M is a multiplication and S a squaring in Fq, then the computational cost of this method to compute (a + bi) m is therefore 1M + 1S per step, where a step involves the processing associated with a single bit of m. The conventional binary exponentiation algorithm for non-special numbers in Fq 2 takes 1 squaring and about 1/2 multiplication in Fq 2 for an overall cost of 2S + 1M and roughly 3M/2 multiplications in Fq per step. If δ = −1, then this can be reduced to 2M plus 3M/2 multiplications in Fq per step 3 . Thus the improved algorithm costs about 60% as much as the basic binary square-and-multiply method. When memory is not an issue the binary algorithm can be implemented by using windowing 3 If a + bi is unitary and δ = −1, one can compute (a + bi) 2 as (2a
techniques, as described in [11] . However the laddering algorithm proposed here for unitary elements will always be faster than a conventional binary algorithm for a general element in Fq 2 .
Note that this improvement is relevant not only for the second part of the final exponentiation of the Tate pairing, but for any exponentiation directly involving pairing values, as happens in many pairing-based protocols [4, 13, 23] .
A laddering pairing algorithm
For U, V ∈ E(F q ), define g U,V to the line through U and V . For all a, b ∈ Z, the line function satisfies (g aP,bP ) = (aP )
Let P ∈ E(F q ), and for c ∈ Z let f c be a function with divisor (f c ) =
up to a constant nonzero factor. This is called Miller's formula. In the computation of the Tate pairing e r (P, Q), this formula can be simplified to
Let (r t , . . . , r 0 ) 2 be the binary representation of r. By coupling Miller's simplified formula with Montgomery's scalar multiplication ladder, we get a laddering version of the BKLS algorithm [1] to compute e r (P, Q):
Laddering BKLS algorithm to compute e r (P, Q):
Compressing pairings to half length
Instead of keeping the full a + bi value of the Tate Pairing, it may be possible for cryptographic purposes to discard b altogether, leaving the values defined only up to complex conjugation, which means one of the pairing arguments will only be defined up to a sign:
This is similar to the point reduction technique, whereby instead of keeping Q = (x, y) one only keeps the abscissa x. Definition 1. The Fq-trace of an element u ∈ Fq 2 is the sum of the conjugates of u, tr(u) = u + u q .
Notice that tr(a + ib) = (a + ib) + (a − ib) = 2a, in effect discarding the imaginary part. We define the compressed Tate pairing ε(P, Q) as tr(e(P, Q)).
Point reduction
Point reduction is an optimization technique introduced by V. Miller in 1985 [20] . It consists of basing cryptographic protocols solely on the x coordinate of the points involved rather than using both coordinates. This setting is possible because the x coordinate of any multiple of a given point P depends only on the x coordinate of P . A related but less efficient technique is that of point compression, which consists of keeping not only the x coordinate but also a single bit β from the y coordinate to choose between the two roots y ± = ± √ x 3 + ax + b. Some pairing-based cryptosystems have been originally defined to take profit from point reduction. An example is the BLS signature scheme [5] , where the signature of a message represented by a curve point M under the signing key s is the x coordinate σ of the point S = sM . This means that, implicitly, the actual signature is ±S rather than S alone. To verify a BLS signature, the verifier checks whether e(M, V ) = e(±S, Q), where the verification key is V = sQ. Incidentally, the verification key itself can be reduced to its x coordinate (say, ξ), even though this possibility does not seem to have been considered by the authors of BLS.
Coupling point reduction with compressed pairings
Verifying a BLS signature involves computing a point V ∈ {V, −V } from ξ, a point S ′ ∈ {S, −S} from σ and checking whether e r (M, V ′ ) = e(S ′ , Q) or e(M, V ′ ) = e(S ′ , Q) −1 . Using the property that any pairing value z is unitary (and hence z −1 = z), one can simply check whether tr(e(M, V ′ )) = tr(e(S ′ , Q)). This is especially interesting, since a compressed pairing ε(P, Q) is precisely tr(e (±P, ±Q) ).
An important aside is that exponentiation of compressed pairings must take into account the fact that they are actually traces of full pairings. This means one cannot exponentiate a pairing as if it were a simple F q k/2 value; rather, one must always handle it as a Lucas sequence element.
A ternary exponentiation ladder
Supersingular curves in characteristic 3 are a popular choice of underlying algebraic structure for pairing-based cryptosystems, since many optimisations are possible in such a setting [1, 8, 9] . Pairing compression is possible for those systems, and we now propose a ternary ladder for Lucas sequences in characteristic 3 that keeps the exponentiation cost in F q k within about 33% of the exponentiation cost in F q k/2 .
Assume the sequence element index is written in signed ternary notation, K = (d t−1 , . . . , d 0 )3, with d t−1 = 1. At step j (counting downwards from t − 1 to 0), we want to compute V Kj where
i . Thus, by definition,
For d j = −1, we write down the formulas to compute V 3Kj+1−2 , V 3Kj+1−1 , and V 3Kj+1 :
Similarly, for d j = 1 we write down the formulas to compute V 3Kj+1 , V 3Kj+1+1 , and V 3Kj+1+2 :
In each case, the second and third relations constitute a simple linear system. Solving them, we get these expressions for V 3Kj+1−1 , V 3Kj+1 , and V 3Kj+1+1 :
If (P 2 − 1) −1 and P + P 3 are precomputed, computing V 3Kj+1 and one of V 3Kj+1−1 or V 3Kj+1+1 involves two products and two cubes, and the computation can be carried out using only V Kj+1 and one of V Kj+1−1 or V Kj+1+1 . We can therefore keep track of which value between these two actually accompanies V Kj+1 , and compute V Kj and V Kj +1 at the cost of only 2 products and two cubes per step. Besides, since we are working in characteristic 3, the cost of cubing is negligible compared to the cost of multiplying.
The binary ladder computes V Kj and V Kj +1 at the cost of one square and one product, or about 1.8 product, per step. However, the step count of the ternary ladder is only about 1/ lg(3) of its binary counterpart, and hence its total cost is about 70% of the binary ladder. We point out that the ternary ladder can be used for plain exponentiation in characteristic 3 as an independent technique, even in contexts where compressed pairings are not desired or not an option.
A detailed ternary ladder algorithm is described in Appendix A.
Compressing pairings to a third of their length
Definition 2. The Fq 2 -trace of an element f ∈ Fq 6 is the value tr(f ) = f + f
When the elliptic curve has an embedding degree k = 6, the Tate pairing algorithm outputs an element of Fq 6 of order r, where r divides q 6 − 1, but not q i − 1 for 0 < i < 6. Now
. Therefore the output of the Tate pairing is an element of order r which divides Φ 6 (q) = q 2 − q + 1. For q ≡ 2 (mod 3), these are precisely the type of points considered in the XTR public key scheme [16] , and all of the time/space optimizations that have been developed for this scheme [16, 27] apply here as well. In particular, we note that laddering algorithms again appear to be optimal [27] , and the Tate pairing output can be represented by its Fq 2 -trace, and hence compressed by a factor of 3. Observe that the compressed value, being a trace, must be implicitly exponentiated using the Lenstra-Verheul algorithm [16, Algorithm 2.3.7] -the trace value per se is not even a point of order r.
For supersingular curves in characteristic 3 we can do better than merely take the trace -rather, it is possible to do all computations without resorting to arithmetic any more complex than that on Fq 2 and implicit trace exponentiation.
Simpler arithmetic for pairing computation in characteristic 3
Let q = 3 m for some odd m, let b = ±1, and let σ, ρ ∈ Fq 6 be elements satisfying σ 2 + 1 = 0 and ρ 3 − ρ − b = 0. The modified Tate pairing on the supersingular curve E(F 3 m ) : y 2 = x 3 − x + b is the mapping f P (φ(Q)) (q 6 −1)/r where φ : E(F q ) → E(F q 6 ) is the distortion map φ(x, y) = (ρ − x, σy).
Duursma and Lee showed [8, Theorem 5] that the modified Tate pairing for points P = (α, β) and Q = (x, y) can be written as a product of factors of form
2 . This expression can be rewritten as g = λ − µρ − ρ 2 , where µ ≡ α + x + b ∈ Fq and λ ≡ βyσ − µ 2 ∈ Fq 2 . Specifically, the Duursma-Lee algorithm to compute f P (φ(Q)) is as follows (cf. [8 
, Algorithm 4]):
Duursma-Lee algorithm to compute f P (φ(Q)):
The output is an element f ∈ Fq 6 . We now show that this algorithm can be modified to compute tr(f ) instead, by maintaining a ladder of three values
Since f is initialized to 1, the initial ladder can be computed from ρ alone, namely, [tr (1) 2 )] according to the following theorem:
Proof. Using the Fq 2 -linearity of the trace and the defining property
T and using the matrix A defined above, the modified algorithm to compute implicit pairings reads:
A laddering algorithm to compute tr(f P (φ(Q))):
end for return L 0
Each step of this algorithm takes 17 Fq multiplications. This compares well with the original Duursma-Lee algorithm where each step takes 20 Fq multiplications, and completely avoids Fq 6 arithmetic.
Implicit exponentiation in characteristic 3
To obtain a unique pairing value from the output of the implicit pairing algorithm, we must replace the final exponentiation f P (φ(Q)) (q 6 −1)/r by an implicit exponentiation tr(f P (φ(Q)) (q 6 −1)/r ). It is also quite commonplace that the pairing value undergoes further exponentiation as dictated by the underlying cryptographic protocol. We are thus confronted with the task of computing tr(g m ) given the value of tr(g). The Lenstra-Verheul algorithm [16, Algorithm 2.3.7] performs this task, but demands that the characteristic be p ≡ 2 (mod 3). We now describe a variant that works in characteristic 3.
Let c ∈ Fq 2 , and let
is an element of order dividing Φ 6 (q) = q 2 − q + 1, then the roots of F (tr(g), X) are the 
Computing c 2n takes two Fq multiplications, c 3n±1 takes four Fq multiplications, and c 3n±2 takes six Fq multiplications. Define L n (c) ≡ c 3n , c 3n+1 , c 3n+2 , c 3n+3 ∈ (F q 2 ) 3 . Using the above formulas, one can compute any one of L 3n (c), L 3n+1 (c), or L 3n+2 (c) from L n (c) at the cost of 12 Fq multiplications:
From the definition of c n , it is clear that c n = tr(g n ) if c = tr(g). Hence, if L ⌊n/3⌋ (tr(g)) = S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , then tr(g n ) = S n mod 3 . The total cost of this algorithm, about 7.6 lg n Fq multiplications, matches the complexity of the ternary ladder introduced in section 5 for Fq 3 -trace exponentiation. Appendix B lists this algorithm in detail. We point out that this ternary ladder can also be the basis of a characteristic 3 variant of the XTR cryptosystem.
Coupling pairing compression with point reduction
A nice feature of this algorithm is that it is compatible with a variant of the point reduction technique.
The conventional approach to compress a point R = (u, v) is to keep only u and a single bit of v; point reduction discards v altogether. In characteristic 3, it is more advantageous to discard u instead, keeping v and a trit of u to distinguish among the solutions of the curve equation u 3 − u + (b − v 2 ) = 0; alternatively, one can reduce R by keeping only v and modifying the cryptographic protocols to allow for any of the three points R 0 , R 1 , and R 2 that share the same v. Thus, we will show that the input to the laddering algorithm of section 6.1 can be only y (or β); the corresponding x (or α) can be easily recovered except for a trit, and the actual choice of this trit does not affect the compressed pairing value.
Let z ∈ Fq 6 where q = 3 m for odd m, and assume the order r of z divides Φ 6 (q), i.e. r | q 2 − q + 1. The conjugates of z are z, z q 2 , and z q 4 , or equivalently z, z q−1 , and z −q , since q 2 ≡ q − 1 (mod r) and q 4 ≡ −q (mod r). The trace of z is the sum of the conjugates, tr(z) = z + z q−1 + z −q [16] . Consider the supersingular elliptic curve E :
is the trace of the Frobenius.
Let P = (x, y) ∈ E(F q ), and let Q ∈ E(F q 6 ) be a linearly independent point. The conjugates of e(P, Q) are e(P, Q), e(P, Q) q−1 = e([q − 1]P, Q), and e(P, Q) −q = e(−qP, Q). The following property holds:
, points P , [q − 1]P , and −qP share precisely the same y coordinate.
Proof. Let P = (x, y). A simple inspection of the group law for characteristic 3 [1] reveals that 3P = (x 9 − b, −y 9 ), and hence 3 j P = (x We see that, for m ≡ 0 (mod 3), the x coordinates of P , [q − 1]P , and −qP are the three solutions to x 3 − x+ (1 − y 2 ) = 0, which are exactly {x, x+ 1, x+ 2}. Obviously, the traces of the pairings computed from the conjugates of P are all equal, since tr(e(P, Q)) is simply the sum of the conjugates of e(P, Q). Thus, the actual solution x to the curve equation above used to compute tr(e(P, Q)) is irrelevant. Also, computing x from y is very efficient, since it amounts to solving a linear system (see appendix C).
Conclusions
We have introduced the notion of compressed pairings, and suggested how they can be realised as traces of ordinary Tate pairings. We also described how compressed pairings can be computed and implicitly exponentiated by means of laddering algorithms, with a compression ratio of 1/2 in characteristic p > 3 and 1/3 in characteristic 3; our algorithms thus reduce bandwidth requirements without impairing performance. Finally, we showed how to couple compressed pairings with the technique of point compression or point reduction. As a side result, we proposed an efficient laddering algorithm for plain exponentitation in characteristic 3, which can be used even in contexts where compressed pairings are not desired.
Our work constitutes evidence that the security of pairing-based cryptosystems is linked to the security of the Lucas/XTR schemes, and gives further motivation for the approach of Galbraith et al. regarding the use of traces to prevent security losses.
We leave it as an open problem to find a method to compute pairings directly in compressed form when the compression ratio is 1/3 or better on ordinary (non-supersingular) curves in characteristic p > 3.
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A Computation of Lucas sequence elements
The Lucas sequence V n (P, 1) is defined by the following recurrence relations:
Let n = (n t . . . n 0 ) 2 be an integer in binary representation, with n t = 1. The Lucas sequence element V n (P, 1) can be computed as:
Let n = (n t . . . n 0 )3 be the signed ternary representation of n 0. The Lucas sequence element V n (P, 1) in characteristic 3 (as needed for the implicit exponentiation of Fq 3 -traces of Fq 6 values) can be computed using the following algorithm: where β ∈ F2 indicates which of the two roots correspond to y = ± √ x 3 + ax + b, or else by (τ, y) where τ ∈ F3 indicates which of the three solutions one has to take of the equation x 3 + ax + (b − y 2 ) = 0. In characteristic 3, cubing is a linear operation, which makes the second possibility more advantageous.
Consider the special equation x 3 − x − u = 0 for a given u ∈ F3 m , which is relevant for supersingular curves in characteristic 3. This equation has a solution if, and only if, tr(u) = 0 [17, theorem 2.25] . This is the case for 1/3 of the elements in Proof. If F3 m is represented in standard polynomial basis, the cubic equation reduces to a system of linear equations with coefficients in F3, and can be solved in no more than O(m 2 ) steps. This is achieved by first checking whether the system has solutions, i.e. whether tr(u) = 0. If so, since the rank of C is m − 1 one obtains an invertible (m − 1) × (m − 1) matrix A by leaving out the one row and correspondingly one column of the matrix representation of C on the given basis. A solution of the cubic equation is then given by an arbitrary element x 0 ∈ F3 and by the solution of system Ax =ũ, which is obtained asx = A ⊓ ⊔
